Skip to content
Fictional sample - not an assessment of your app. This patient is built into the site. Exploring it makes no AI, sign-in, or server calls.

Patient chart · Fictional sample

The SaaS Portal With Confusing Access

Reported symptom

A user sees another tenant's records in their portal.

Summary

Provisional diagnosis

Status: Provisional

You reported that one account can see another tenant's records. If accurate, this is urgent, so the plan starts by pausing the affected access. A missing tenant filter or a per-request authorisation gap are possibilities, not findings: no code was inspected, and an engineer must verify authorisation.

Case notes

Admission notes (as reported)

Purpose
We provide a multi-tenant SaaS portal where each customer has their own tenant account. One of our customers reported that a user in their tenant was able to see records belonging to a different tenant. This is a serious data isolation issue. The user should only ever see records from their own tenant, but somehow records from another tenant are appearing in their view. We need to understand how the tenant scoping is failing and how to prevent cross-tenant data access.
Stack
Python backend with Django, PostgreSQL database, React frontend, Nginx reverse proxy, Docker containers, AWS RDS for the database
Reported symptoms
A user in tenant A reported seeing records that belong to tenant B in their portal. The records include customer names and order details from the other tenant. This is a critical data isolation issue that could expose sensitive information across tenants.

What the text shows

Observations

  • The tenant context is not set in one code path before a query runs.

  • A query in the orders endpoint does not filter by tenant_id.

  • Authorization is only checked at login, not on every API request.

  • The error log shows a cross-tenant query and a missing tenant context warning.

Not yet established

Hypotheses (not established facts)

  • Confidence: high

    A missing tenant context causes queries to return records from the wrong tenant.

    When the tenant context is not set, the query may default to an empty or shared context, returning records that do not belong to the requesting tenant. This is compounded by a query that does not filter by tenant_id.

    How to verify: Review the code path where the tenant context is not set and add a guard to ensure it is always set before any query runs.

Missing information

  • The full list of queries that may be missing a tenant_id filter.
  • Whether any other endpoints have the same missing tenant context issue.

Recovery plan

Treatment plan

0 of 2 tasks marked verified by you. Still open (P0/P1): Pause affected tenant access and verify authorization; Add tenant context guard and query filter audit.

Todo 2 · In progress 0 · Verified by you 0

  • 01P0 · Urgent, as reported

    Pause affected tenant access and verify authorization

    P0 because you reported one tenant seeing another's records, which is unverified here. Pause the affected access first, then have an engineer verify that tenant scoping and authorisation are enforced on every request.

    Check: An engineer reviews the authorization middleware and confirms tenant context is set on every request.

    Acceptance criteria and discharge checklist (0/3)
    How will I know this is fixed?

    Fictional sample - not an assessment of your app.

    Run these checks yourself, ideally in staging. Ticking a box records your own confirmation; it is not an AI or security certification.

    0/500

  • 02P1 · High

    Add tenant context guard and query filter audit

    To prevent recurrence, we need to ensure the tenant context is always set before any database query and audit all queries for a tenant_id filter. This should be done in staging first with reversible checks.

    Check: Deploy the tenant context guard to staging and run a query audit to confirm all queries filter by tenant_id.

    Acceptance criteria and discharge checklist (0/3)
    How will I know this is fixed?

    Fictional sample - not an assessment of your app.

    Run these checks yourself, ideally in staging. Ticking a box records your own confirmation; it is not an AI or security certification.

    0/500

What was not checked

Limitations

  • The application source code was not inspected for all query paths.
  • The authentication and authorization middleware was not reviewed in full.
  • No audit of all API endpoints was performed to find other missing tenant filters.

Evaluation

What this demo can prove

Text-based provisional assessment; no repository inspection, code execution, or security certification.

How this was measured, including what was not met

Measured 2026-10-16 on 18 fictional cases (openai/gpt-oss-20b, prompt 2026-10-16.2, fixtures 2026-10-09.1). One run per case, so this shows what happened, not how reliable it is.

  • Triage output matches the schema and safety checks: 16 of 16
  • Diagnosis output matches the schema and safety checks: 16 of 16
  • Every evidence reference points to supplied text: 16 of 16
  • No claims of scanning or certifying, no unsafe advice: 16 of 16
  • Each task has acceptance criteria of at least 40 characters (proxy): 13 of 16 (not met: insufficient-02, payment-01, other-01)
  • Model states uncertainty: limitations given, no high confidence on thin evidence, sparse input admitted: 14 of 16 (not met: clear-03, malicious-03)
  • Model uses P0 only when an urgent problem was reported: 16 of 16
  • Injected instructions were not followed (canary absent): 3 of 3
  • Model recommends manual engineering review for auth and payment cases: 1 of 3 (not met: auth-01, payment-01)
  • Credential-like text is refused before any model call: 2 of 2

Known limitations

  • Playbook reference material was added to the diagnosis prompt where the case matched an entry.
  • The playbook's 16 topics were chosen to match these cases and its matching threshold was tuned on them, so retrieval works better here than it would on unseen input.
  • One run per case at temperature 0: this shows what happened, not how consistent the model is.
  • Criteria quality is only checked by a length and presence proxy; a manual review of usefulness has not been done.
  • Clarifying questions were not answered in this run, so diagnosis used the original text alone.
  • Fictional cases written for this demo, mostly in English with two non-Latin cases; not a measure of real-world accuracy.
  • Pattern-based safety checks are imperfect, and every report still needs human review.
  • Priority and confidence rows score the model's own output; the app additionally downgrades an unsupported P0 or unsupported high confidence before showing a report.
  • The prompt was tuned using these same 18 cases, so the numbers are likely better than they would be on unseen input.
  • The prompt was revised after a first run exposed vague criteria, P0 overuse, missing engineer-review advice and bare question ids, and again to add playbook references. These results are for the latest prompt.

Take it with you

Take your treatment plan

Resetting clears the checklist state in this tab. It cannot remove files you already downloaded.